Using data from several sources, we show that households nearing retirement have lower rates of housing distress than younger households, as measured by arrears and foreclosure rates. 
Introduction
The current economic crisis has been unmatched in severity by any since the Great Depression, with employment falling 4.3 percent between 2008 and 2009. 1 Older households in the 1930s had little in the way of retirement assets, and heavy job losses caused grave economic distress, disproportionately affecting older households and ultimately inducing the passage of the Social Security Act. Today, many households have multiple assets to draw on to smooth consumption in case of job loss or retirement asset losses. Yet, the crash of housing markets, occurring simultaneously with massive job and asset market losses, has undercut the ability of households to ride out the recession, perhaps having disproportionately severe effects on households nearing retirement.
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Recessions undermine the ability of households to prepare for retirement; these effects are exacerbated when combined with housing shocks. Some workers may be forced into early retirement by premature job loss, just at a time when many wish to work longer because both their retirement accounts and housing equity have shrunk and, in some cases, their mortgage payments have jumped. Other workers who retain their jobs may take real pay or hours cuts and may have to drain their retirement accounts to meet mortgage payments. As these possibilities suggest, several features cause older households to experience the triple hit of job, asset, and housing market losses differently than prime-age households. Some of these factors have also changed in important ways from earlier recessions.
One factor that has distinguished the experience of older workers in recessions, and that has changed in recent years, involves the nature of their retirement saving. Obviously, older households have accumulated more life-cycle saving than prime-age workers. Although these assets can be used to smooth consumption during recessions, such appropriation simultaneously undermines retirement preparedness. As a result, the form that this saving takes is critical. Over several decades, retiring workers enjoyed increasingly generous annuities deriving from both Social Security and defined benefit (DB) pensions. While these retirement benefits may increase overall wealth and reduce poverty, they come at the cost of reducing liquidity during working years and are unavailable to smooth consumption during recessions. 3 Recent changes have shifted the retirement saving landscape. Real Social Security benefits flattened out for workers retiring in the 1980s and 1990s and began declining in 2000, and DB pension coverage has dropped, sharply for prime-age workers and more gradually for older workers (Friedberg and Owyang 2002) . DB plans have largely been replaced by defined contribution (DC) plans, which have three important features for consideration here. First, they are more liquid than DB plans and thus are available to some extent to smooth consumption during recessions. 4 Second, and undercutting this, is that they are vulnerable to asset market fluctuations, eroding in the face of the stock market declines of 2007-09. DC plans lost 20 percent of their value between 2007 and 2008, regaining some value the next year but sustaining a two-year loss of 7 percent. 5 Third, participation in them is often voluntary, raising the risk that people have not saved enough for retirement, although potentially facilitating consumption smoothing during recessions by allowing workers to reduce retirement saving temporarily.
A second factor that may distinguish older workers, and that we focus on in our investigation, is their exposure to the massive housing crisis, which is atypical of post-war recessions. Housing constitutes one of the major forms of wealth of retiring households, yet its illiquidity is well documented; older households rarely reduce housing equity until the death or nursing home entry of one spouse (Venti and Wise 2001) . 6 To this extent, transitory house price declines may have little effect on the retirement preparedness of many older households, given their long horizon over which to ride out fluctuations. Declines in house prices will adversely affect households that need to liquidate housing wealth by drawing down equity or moving perhaps in response to job loss. Also, the increased access to housing credit associated with the post-2000 housing 3 It remains an open question whether public and private pensions raise total retirement wealth. Engelhardt and Gruber (2006) show that Social Security reduced poverty rates, suggesting real wealth increases for at least some. 4 DC plan assets may be accessed in the event of job exit, with a 10 percent penalty for people under age 59 ½. An increasing number of employers allow current workers to borrow against their DC plan balances as well. Notably, DB plans are increasingly offering a lump-sum payout upon job separation as well. 5 Investment Company Institute, http://www.ici.org/pdf/fm-v19n3.pdf. 6 Banks et al (2006) find new evidence that older American households downsize in the form of reducing the number of rooms in their residences independent of household demographic changes, by one-tenth of a room between ages 65-69 and 70-74 and again between ages 70-74 and 75-79 and then by about two-tenths of a room between ages 75-79 and ages 80+. They do not further examine whether this downsizing is associated with reduced housing equity.
boom has increased mortgage obligations for many households and exposed them to liquidity problems in meeting housing payments, in response to both rate adjustments on variable-interest loans and income shocks due to job loss. Although older households may be less exposed to such problems, to the extent that they paid off their mortgages and avoided speculating in the housing boom, any increase in mortgage debt will impede their ability to tap housing equity in retirement through, for example, reverse mortgages or downsizing. Little is known about the relative exposure of older households to the housing crisis.
Thus, we investigate the impact of the housing crisis, which differentiates the current recession from previous ones, on the retirement preparedness of older households. To sum up, this impact depends on (1) the extent to which older households liquefied their housing wealth, and (2) the extent to which they then got hit with labor and asset market shocks. The impact of labor market shocks on older workers has been severe, and the impact of asset market shocks is being newly felt, due to the shift from DB to DC pensions. Moreover, the incidence of housing distress was greater among black and Hispanic households, even after controlling for income and education, possibly reflecting unfavorable mortgage terms offered to ethnic minorities. We use our econometric model to forecast the risk of mortgage arrears and foreclosures among older households through 2012. We project that the risk of arrears will increase to 4.2 percent in 2010, declining to 3.6 percent by 2012.
Background
Households Historically, home-owners accumulated significant housing equity during their working lives and entered retirement with little or no mortgage debt. In the 1992 HRS, the median mortgage 7 We do not know from these data sources how the incidence of housing distress differs for older households currently compared to past cohorts, but we expect that it is worse now, given the trend in loan-to-value ratios.
among households with a member aged 51-61 was $15,600. One might therefore expect the housing crisis to affect older households only to the extent that it reduced the amount of housing wealth available for consumption in retirement or to pass as a bequest, an important issue as the house represents the single most valuable asset of households in retirement, after Social Security.
Yet, the AARP Public Policy Institute (2008) finds that those over age 50 represent 28 percent of all households in arrears or foreclosure. Among older households, the highest rates are among traditionally disadvantaged groups. The effects of foreclosure are also arguably more serious for older households who have less time to recover from any resulting financial loss.
The housing crisis has been accompanied by severe job loss and a relatively large correction to the stock market. Older workers are much more exposed to stock market fluctuations than in the past. The reasons are the use of tax incentives to promote retirement saving in the form of Individual Retirement Accounts and 401(k) accounts, and the shift in pension coverage from DB to DC, which shifts financial risk from employers to employees. These factors have led to a substantial increase in stock market participation. Among full-time employees with a pension in the Survey of Consumer Finances, 69 percent had a DB plan and 45 percent had a DC plan in 1983, while 39 percent had a DB plan and 80 percent had a DC plan in 2001 (Friedberg and Owyang 2005) . Nevertheless, older workers have higher rates of DB coverage than others, and evidence shows that the wealthiest are the ones who took the biggest hit to their portfolios.
Empirical Strategy
We employ several approaches in order to analyze housing distress among retiring cohorts. debt. Non-response rates are known to be high in survey questions about wealth; when HRS respondents refused to answer questions about exact asset balances, for example, they were invited to provide ranges in which their asset balances fell. The HRS used hot-deck imputation, taking exact information from a respondent who answered the question and had similar characteristics as a respondent who refused. We use these imputed values as part of our analysis.
Also, we use sample weights in our analysis to make the samples nationally representative.
Second, we focus on a series of questions asked in the 2008 wave about housing distress. Although the data has the advantage of being more up to date, we decided not to subject it to further analysis.
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
The PSID began in 1968 as a longitudinal study of 4,800 families, consisting of a nationally representative sample and a low-income subsample. The offshoots of these families have been added to the survey, growing to more than 7,000 families in 2001. Families were interviewed every year until 1997 and then every two years.
As in the HRS, additional questions to gauge housing distress were asked in 2009. We use these questions, along with information from some of the previous waves, to compare levels of and characteristics associated with housing distress for HRS households with both older and primeage households in the PSID. To facilitate this comparison, we divide the PSID sample into households whose head was born in or before 1953, and so generally comparable to the age cohorts covered in the HRS from 2004 on, and households whose head was born in or after 1954.
Comparisons of Housing Wealth Across HRS Cohorts
We begin by analyzing household assets and debts across different cohorts entering the HRS.
We focus on households aged 51-56 in 1992, 1998, and 2004 , and the same households aged 57-62 six years later (along with those aged 57-62 in 1992 for the sake of comparison). 11 We focus on both housing and non-housing wealth, as housing wealth is relatively illiquid and therefore unavailable to support consumption during retirement. Table 1 We first compare the housing characteristics of households that were in arrears in 2008 and those that were not, using weights to make the sample nationally representative. Households in arrears had higher mortgage payments as a percentage of income in 2006 (19 percent at the median, versus 10 percent for households not in arrears), bigger mortgages ($108,000 at the median, versus $64,800), and lower house values ($162,000 at the median, versus $216,000), leading to significantly lower home equity ($44,280 at the median, versus $123,120 for households not in arrears). Households in arrears were, however, less likely to hold a home equity loan (11 percent, versus 18 percent for those not in arrears) and had similar levels of non-housing debt ($7,416 at the mean, versus $6,331). Lastly, households in arrears were much less likely to report that local housing conditions were good or excellent (14 percent, versus 42 percent for those not in arrears).
Incidence of Housing Distress
In comparing the characteristics of households that were in arrears and those that were not, it is apparent that the distressed group has worse socioeconomic characteristics. Among households in arrears, the financial respondent in the household was substantially less likely to have completed college (13 percent for those in arrears, versus 33 percent for those who were not) and more likely to be black (26 percent versus 8 percent) or Hispanic (13 percent versus 6 percent). 
Factors Associated with Housing Distress
We analyze socioeconomic conditions that are associated with being at risk of arrears. To do so, we estimate weighted probit models using the HRS sample. In order to deal with the small sample size when analyzing factors contributing to housing distress, we will include the group that reports that arrears are somewhat or very likely within the next six months together with the group that is in arrears or has experienced foreclosure. As the group anticipating arrears has worse socioeconomic characteristics than the group not anticipating arrears, the subgroups considered together are relatively similar. This results in a sample of 178 households at risk of arrears and 1,748 not at risk. The number of households not at risk of arrears has shrunk from the 1,918 that appear in Table 3 to 1,748 because of missing data. The left-hand side variable in our probit model takes a value of one if the household is at risk of housing distress (already in arrears or foreclosure, or anticipating arrears within the next six months) and zero if not. The weights make the estimates nationally representative, and the weighted mean risk of housing distress in the sample is 9.4 percent.
The estimation results, reported in terms of estimated marginal effects, appear in Table 5 . We find that higher income has a significant but small effect on the likelihood of being at risk of We do not include other measures of household wealth as right-hand side variables, as these are correlated with housing wealth. We would be hesitant to attribute a causal interpretation to a variable like financial wealth, as households that are diligent in saving for retirement may also be careful about drawing down housing equity, so that it is not high financial wealth that causes households to avoid financial distress, but rather an innate sense of caution. We have some similar concerns about measures of housing obligations, which reflect housing markets (that can be viewed as exogenous) and housing choices (that may be endogenously determined with choosing not to keep up with current mortgage payments). Nevertheless, we have included the household's loan-to-value ratio from 2006 as an explanatory variable in the current set of results in order to capture the effects of exposure to housing market volatility, and it is statistically significant and positive. When the loan-to-value ratio rises by 10 percentage points, then the likelihood of being at risk of arrears rises by 0.77 percentage points.
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Stafford and Gouskova (2010) estimate a similar probit model using households of all ages in the PSID. They find a similar relationship between mortgage distress and education and ethnicity across ages, but in contrast to our analysis of HRS data, they find a significant and substantial relationship between mortgage distress and debt service ratios. This likely reflects the much higher debt service ratios of the younger households included in the PSID. 
Housing Distress of Family Members
The 2008 HRS asked all respondents whether they had family members (children or others) who were experiencing mortgage arrears and foreclosure. Thus, while older households have relatively low rates of housing distress, they may help other family members in trouble, and, in doing so, reduce their preparedness for retirement; their ability to offer such assistance may have risen as illiquid DB pensions have been replaced by more liquid DC accounts. Table 6 reports the incidence of housing distress among family members of HRS respondents.
Of 10,494 respondents, 6.7 percent reported having a family member who fell behind on his or her mortgage payments. Among the ones with a family member experiencing such trouble, 42 percent reported giving help to this family member, and 58 percent did not. Respondents with family members in distress had lower household income ($46,656 at the median versus $52,294) and lower financial wealth in 2006 ($7,000 at the median versus $18,000) in comparison to respondents with no family members experiencing housing distress. However, within this group, those who gave help had considerably better finances than those who did not. Thus, we cannot conclude from the evidence that older households are raiding their retirement nest eggs to assist family members in housing-related financial difficulty.
Conclusions
We find that households nearing retirement are more exposed to housing market volatility than in (5) and (7) are reported in this colum 1 Significance test of the difference in estimates in columns (5) and (9) are reported in this column 2 Significance test of the difference in estiamtes in columns (6) and (9) are reported in this colum 3 Significance test of the difference in estimates in columns (7) and (10) a, b and c denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. (7) and (9) are reported in this colum 3 Total debt is the sum of all mortgages, other loans, 2nd home mortgages, and other debt. 4 This measure of financial wealth does not include IRA, business, or transportation wealth.
5 Housing equity equals the value of the primary residence minus all mortgages and other loans.
a, b and c denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
